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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is directed at the federal tax law’s lack of consistency in
the treatment of parents and grandparents who wish to give some of their
income or asset wealth to minor and adult children, particularly for their
college education. There is a distinct, yet quite subtle, favoritism
accorded to parents and grandparents (and other relatives or friends) who
are able to shift income or asset wealth from their publicly traded
securities and other “passive” investments to children through custodial
accounts and other mechanisms. Those who derive their income from
private (non-publicly traded) businesses and the performance of
services, or “active” endeavors, are treated much less favorably, forcing
them to resort to more costly and more complex methods to shift income
to or for the benefit of their children.
In the past few years, Congress has added several tax benefits for
higher education,1 but they are generally limited to taxpayers with
income under $100,000.2 However, for a variety of reasons (some
1. Data on the subject of tax benefits for higher education is as yet not complete.
What limited data is available indicates that there was an estimated $13.9 billion in direct
grants (for 2001–2002) and an estimated $44.1 billion in student loans and work-study
money (for 2001–2002) available for students in higher education. The College Board,
Trends in Student Aid, 2003, at tbl. 2 (updated Oct. 27, 2003), available at
www.collegeboard.com. The direct benefits available through the tax law, however, are
substantially lower. They include education credits of $5.1 billion claimed on only 7.2
million tax returns. Michael Parisi & David Campbell, Individual Income Tax Returns,
2001, in Internal Revenue Statistics of Income Bulletin, 8, 34 (Fall 2003).
Other tax subsidies, such as the scholarship exclusion, the charitable contribution
deduction for all education, the deduction for higher education expenses, the deduction
for interest on student loans, the interest exclusion for education bonds, and the
exclusion of earnings on education trusts, as listed in the 2003 Tax Expenditure Budget,
total around $15 billion. Excerpt from Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2000–2006, Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Jan. 17, 2002, in MICHAEL
J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 39–42 (rev. 4th ed. 2002). The Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and
Analyses Relating to Tax Benefits for Higher Education (JCX-52-04), July 21, 2004,
summarizes the various current tax benefits for higher education expenses. This data is
also published in 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY. JCT Describes Tax Benefits for Higher
Education Expenses, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 22, 2004, available in LEXIS, at 2004
TNT 141–18. The JCT estimates total government tax expenditures for individuals for
2004–2008 to be almost $50 billion or about $10 billion per year. The Joint Committee
on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2004–2008 (JCX8-03), Dec. 22, 2003, at 25.
2. I.R.C. § 529 state tuition plans are available to taxpayers with higher incomes,
but they can only be funded with after-tax dollars (however, income from the accounts
accumulate tax-free, with distributions also tax-free if used for qualified education
expenses). The § 529 plans are explained in the Joint Committee on Taxation Report of
July 21, 2004, cited supra note 1. The new low rate on dividends and capital gains may
offer greater tax benefits than the much touted § 529 plans. See JOBS AND GROWTH TAX
RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2003: LAW EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 78 (CCH
Incorporated 2003), stating that “parents may wish to reconsider the use of other tax-
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known and some not) these tax credits, exclusions, and deductions are
utilized by a small minority of taxpayers and their children.3 In fact, the
most significant tax benefits for higher education have been in the
Internal Revenue Code for several years, but are subtly buried in the
structure of the tax law as a whole.
A recent example demonstrates how this indirect preferential subsidy
works. The 2003 Tax Act4 reduced the rate of tax on dividends and
most capital gains to a maximum rate of 15%, with a rate as low as 5%
(zero percent in 2008) for those (including children) in the lower regular
income tax rate brackets. Unless Congress extends these lower rates,
they sunset after 2008. The main purpose of this legislation was to
reduce the burden of double taxation of corporate profits. But, as
discussed in Part IIIA below, there is now a new opportunity for passive
investors to cut their tax liability by as much as two-thirds by shifting
dividend and capital gain income to children or grandchildren, who may
then use the income for higher education. This tax subsidy is not
available to taxpayers with services income or income derived from
actively-operated businesses, who remain taxable at a maximum rate of
35%. This new law provides more in tax incentives for a select number
of people (who receive dividend and capital gain income) than all
specific education tax credits combined.5
We need to explore here some of these broader tax benefits which
have favored some taxpayers (based on the source of their income) to the
implicit exclusion of the majority of American children who would also
like to go to college, but have no trust funds or specially created
investments for them. This favoritism is brought about through the
federal tax laws and must therefore be regarded as a byproduct of
Congressional tax policy as it relates to support for higher education.
While children of wealthier families will obviously have more
opportunities to attend college, this paper will focus generally on the
favored savings vehicles such as [I.R.C. § 529] plans and Coverdell Education Savings
Accounts.”
3. See The College Board, supra note 1.
4. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, §§ 301–302, Pub. L.
No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
5. The projected revenue cost of the rate reductions for dividends and most
capital gains for 2005 is about $20 billion, and is expected to be higher for years 2006–
2008. Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 2, The “Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003” Fiscal Years 2003–2013 (Joint
Committee on Taxation, JCX-55-03, May 22, 2003).
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horizontal inequity (taxpayers with the same amount of income) and not
the vertical inequity (taxpayers with different levels of income) that
results in the discrimination addressed.
After briefly exploring the historical origins of the prohibitions on socalled “income splitting,” and some of their statutory exceptions, the
Article then discusses how the graduated rate structure and other features
of the income, gift, and estate tax laws are directly responsible for
freezing out the majority of children in this country from various higher
education tax incentives provided, in effect, to only a relatively narrow
or targeted group of children whose parents or grandparents derive their
income from personal services and actively operated businesses.
The Article then explores a few alternatives to resolve this discrimination,
with a view towards broadening educational opportunities for a larger
number of children, without regard to either the source or amount of
income of their parents. Some of these alternatives may be far less costly to
the government (and more beneficial to our economic and social being)
than the present patch quilt of complex and incoherent tax incentives.6
II. ORIGINS OF THE BAN ON INCOME SPLITTING: LUCAS V. EARL AND ITS
PROGENY IN THE AMERICAN TAX SYSTEM
One of the consequences of having a graduated income tax rate
structure is the incentive to shift or split income with family members
and others in lower tax brackets. While it is assumed that the practice of
income splitting has been curtailed, there are a number of mechanisms or
strategies employed by taxpayers to effectuate the shift. In other words,
the practice is still occurring in a disguised manner, but only for certain
types of taxpayers and certain types of transactions.7 Because we do not
6. Because of the most recent changes in the rate structure generally, and in the
lower rates for dividends and capital gains as well as the lower rates and eventual repeal
of the estate tax on transfers of wealth, I will omit discussion in this paper of any revenue
gains and losses resulting from all proposals made in Part V. However, as discussed in
Part III, the lower rates for dividends and capital gains enacted in 2003, with rates as low
as 5% for those in lower income tax brackets, create a significant new opportunity for
those taxpayers with income from these passive investment sources to shift income to
children.
7. Income shifting is quite pervasive, outside the family or transfer to children
context, in private businesses, such as partnerships and limited liability companies and
“S” corporations, where the pass-through or conduit structure inherently allows it. The
Congressional attempts to curb income (or deduction) shifting that have “no substantial
economic effect” (I.R.C. § 704(b) (2004)) are basically flawed. See Lawrence Lokken,
Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA.
TAX REV. 249 (1999). Much more sophisticated and significant income shifting occurs
in the public corporation and its subsidiaries, both in the United States and abroad. This
is not simply a result of a graduated rate structure, but more often than not an allocation
of profit or loss wherever it will produce the lowest overall tax burden.
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have any hard data on the extent or magnitude of income splitting, we
should not assume that it does not exist in a more disguised form.
The overriding concern against shifting one’s income to another
person is a direct consequence of having a graduated rate (as distinguished
from a flat rate) structure. If all income were taxed at the same rate, without
regard to how high or low it was, there would be little or no problem
with assigning or splitting income with another taxpayer.8 What tax
policy objective is accomplished by bestowing more favorable taxsavings options upon passive investors of capital than upon the rest of
the tax-paying public? The question will be explored in Parts III and IV.
While the Internal Revenue Code did not originally expressly prohibit
shifting or assigning income, over seventy years ago the United States
Supreme Court held, in a classic opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, that the
federal tax law would not recognize a valid state contract by a husband
and wife to divide their respective incomes equally.9 As a result, the
husband was taxed on the full amount of his personal services income
even though one-half was legally owned by his wife, and even though
they entered into this income splitting arrangement in 1901, during the
period when there was no income tax in the United States. Thus, despite
the fact that there was no tax-avoidance motive for their agreement, the
Court, in an obscurely worded opinion, was presumably protecting the
graduated tax rate structure.10 Nevertheless, the Earl opinion has had a
profound impact in creating the so-called “assignment of income”
doctrine11 that has been applied in a wide variety of tax cases. While
8. There would be an administrative issue of tracing the liability for taxes on that
income to more than one person, but this is already part of the “warp” and “woof” of an
income tax system that readily permits income to be divided among numerous partners,
joint owners, and business entities of all types. The standard deduction and dependency
exemption both provide some incentive for assigning income to a person with no other
income, apart from the graduated rate structure, but this is assumed to be a much lesser
concern.
9. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113–15 (1930). Some of the Earl discussion
which follows is taken from an earlier piece of mine: Lester B. Snyder, Taxation with an
Attitude: Can We Rationalize the Distinction Between “Earned” and “Unearned”
Income?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 241, 259–61 (1998).
10. Professor Boris Bittker, a leading tax scholar, is quite critical of that decision.
“The opinion in Lucas v. Earl is late-vintage Holmes, magisterial in tone, studded with
quotable phrases, and devoid of analysis.” See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1401 (1975) (footnote omitted).
11. The theory advanced by Holmes is based on the following quoted phrase from
the Earl opinion:
[T]his case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import
and reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the statute
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Congress later expressly reversed Earl in 1948, when it enacted the joint
return allowing income splitting among spouses, the assignment of
income remains in full force for nonspousal income splitting cases,
particularly as it applies to transfers of income to children (whether
minors or adults) and other family members.
The impact of Earl is aptly assessed by Professor Bittker:
Under Lucas v. Earl, it became virtually impossible for a taxpayer with
income from wages, salaries, or professional fees to shift these items to other
taxpayers such as a spouse or child.
But dividends, interest, rents, and other forms of investment income were
affected very differently by Lucas v. Earl than income from personal services.
The “tree” (to use Justice Holmes’ metaphor) that produces investment
income, according to the courts, was the underlying property itself, so that the
income is taxable to the person owning the property when the income arises.
Thus, taxpayers wanting to shift the tax liability for investment income to their
spouses or children found it possible to do so with impunity, if they were
prepared to give up ownership of the underlying securities, bank account,
rental real estate, or other property.12

In other words, a partial transfer of a few shares of stock would suffice
to shift the income from those shares.13 Taxpayers who derive their
income from services, however, are thus excluded from any incomeshifting to children. There is no statute, as such, proscribing this result;
simply a carryover of Earl.
However, Earl as such does not prohibit all parental shifting of
income to children. Those who have publicly traded stocks or securities
which pay dividends or which have appreciated in value, or both, have a
clear and direct path to shifting income taxes on the dividend income
and unrealized gain to adult or minor children or grandchildren. Parents
or grandparents who have other types of property, such as interests in
closely held businesses, real estate, copyrights, and other intellectual
property have to utilize indirect and often complex mechanisms in their
attempts to shift income to their offspring. These indirect devices, such
as family partnerships, gift/leasebacks, private annuities, etc., are more
often than not regarded with suspicion by the Internal Revenue Service
could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not
be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully
devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we
think that no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the
arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew.
Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114–15 (emphasis added).
12. Bittker, supra note 10, at 1401.
13. Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940), where the Court (with three
dissenting opinions disagreeing with Earl) held that a gift of interest coupons from bonds
held by the father did not shift the fruit from his tree, consistent with Earl.
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(IRS), resulting in more costly financial and legal planning with a high
probability of litigation.
Allowing wage earners and portfolio investors equal access to income
splitting with their children would change the eighty-year-old judicially
created doctrine, which has outlived its usefulness, and runs counter to
the contemporary wishes of most of our citizens. The proposals
suggested in Part V have the potential of partially resolving contentious
issues of the day, such as financing private and public education without
engaging in policy and constitutional conflict. Revising or eliminating
the Earl prohibition on assignment of income and replacing it with a
normative incentive to assign income to children would have a more
positive impact on broadening the higher education student base for the
majority of American children.14
This Article argues for a more harmonized or uniformly consistent
treatment of income splitting with children. Uniformity is often viewed
either as an unattainable theoretical ideal or on a more mundane level as
a way, in effect, to reduce the choices for tax planning. While the tax
law is hardly a model of uniformity in its treatment of tax burdens and
benefits, uniformity is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence
as found, for example, in the equal protection and due process clauses of
our Constitution. Uniformity, or “logical consistency,” is a concept
discussed in respected nontax scholarship.15
One major rationale for the generic ban on income splitting with
minor children under current tax law is the theory of “parental
control.”16 It is presumed that any transfer of an asset to a minor is in
reality not a transfer at all because of the de facto control of the asset by
the parent. I will argue that this rationale merely disguises favoritism for
some types of parental gifts over others. There are a number of different
14. Although this Article is not directed at the education grants available to lowincome citizens who pay little or no taxes, the proposal suggested in Part V could be in
the form of a refundable tax credit (similar to the earned income tax credit in I.R.C. § 32
(2004)). By folding in some of the nontax subsidies with the proposed tax credit, the
revenue impact may be far less onerous on the federal government.
15. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavall, Notions of Fairness Versus the
Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000).
16. For an analysis of the control theory and other theories of tax law in
expenditures for children, including a “consumption” expense theory, see Lawrence
Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349, 359–61 (1994); Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 354–58 (1994). For an
economic analysis of the costs of raising children, see THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE,
INVESTING IN CHILDREN (1984).
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methods for accomplishing income and wealth shifts to children and
others. Some work, others do not, but they are often only superficially
different. Indeed, the accepted methods are more often than not
substantively equivalent to other methods which are verboten. With
careful drafting of legal instruments by astute lawyers, a substantial
amount of income and wealth may be transferred to children during the
lifetime of a parent, resulting in much lower tax burdens. Yet parental
control is retained through some artificial, yet legal, entity or structure,
such as a trust,17 a family limited partnership, a private annuity, a
disguised installment sale, or a gift and leaseback arrangement.
This creates a disparity in power and wealth between children of
passive investors and children of active earners and private businesses.
The larger issue is, which children in future generations will have more
power and influence? The fact that all children may eventually inherit
their parent’s wealth is besides the point, where the tax laws leave more
to the favored income and wealth assignee. As will become evident
throughout this Article, the issues discussed are for the most part
applicable under present law to high-middle income and high income
taxpayers, some of whom have more options to shift income and wealth
to their children than others in their same income class.18
The proposal discussed in Part V would not only treat all high income
taxpayers alike, but more significantly would introduce an incentive for
all classes of taxpayers to shift a percentage of their income to their
children. This is a more positive approach, not penalizing owners of
publicly traded stock or upper income taxpayers, but including them
alongside other parents in starting a new approach. The revenue
required to fund this proposal can come from replacing in part some of
the current less effective and discriminatory tax benefits purportedly
aimed at education. A comparative analysis of current and recently
enacted education incentives would show how incomplete and
insignificant these benefits are when compared to the proposal advanced
in this paper.
This Article does not deal directly with the ongoing debates on
17. See infra note 29, for reference to Congressional attempt to curtail use of trusts
for income splitting purposes by compressing the rates for trusts which accumulate (as
distinguished from those that distribute) income to the minors’ guardians or custodians.
I.R.C. § 1(e). Taxable income over $9550 was taxed at the 35% rate bracket in 2004 (the
bracket is indexed for inflation each year).
18. For an interesting look at parent-child profiles and econometric data to
determine the impact of income splitting and other rules on future generations of
children, see articles infra note 74. While these articles analyze important distributional
issues, such as what classes of taxpayers give to children during life, this Article attempts
to go beyond that by questioning the differences between parents with different types of
assets and sources of income.
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whether the wealth transfer taxes should be permanently repealed, and
the related suggestions of imposing an income tax on gifts and bequests.
However, I argue in Part III that the recently “now you see it, now you
don’t” repeal of the wealth transfer taxes19 would have resulted in a
significant simplification of the potpourri of income-shifting rules and
brought some uniformity of tax burden to taxpayers with different types
of assets. But the recent tax legislation will instead make gift and estate
planning a more complex task than before, and will further my argument
for the proposals advanced in this Article.20
III. INCOME-SHIFTING IN THREE CONTEXTS
A. Publicly-Traded Stocks and Securities
Stocks or securities of major corporations which are publicly traded in
the financial markets generally can be transferred to children with the
least difficulty, but with the highest probability of tax savings to the
transferor-donor during her lifetime.21 Consider the following example:
Mother owns (among her many other assets) 10,000 shares of G, Inc.
stock (publicly traded), which she purchased several years ago for $10
per share or $100,000. The stock, which is now trading at $100 per
share (thus having a total fair market value of $1,000,000), has been
paying regular annual dividends to Mother of $8 per share or $80,000.
Her federal income tax liability on these dividends in tax years 2003–
2008 amounts to $12,000 per year at the highest marginal tax rate of
15%,22 although her tax liability in years before 2003 and after 2008
19. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 39 (2001).
20. A proposal by Professors Shakow and Shuldiner for a low, flat rate
“comprehensive wealth tax” would offer a more equitable solution to the problems in the
current regime, even with some inevitable valuation problems. David Shakow & Reed
Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000). See also Michael
S. Knoll, Of Fruit and Trees: The Relationship Between Income and Wealth Taxes, 53
TAX L. REV. 587 (2000); James R. Repetti, It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607
(2000). For evaluation of alternative tax systems see John B. Shoven & Paul Taubman,
Saving, Capital Income, and Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 203, 203–04
(Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
21. Publicly traded securities would include other investments, such as certain
options, financial derivatives, some mutual funds, and some real estate investment trusts,
etc., which are normally traded in the securities markets. Privately-owned real estate is
generally controlled by a small number of persons, making transfers of pieces of the
property to children a more difficult task than transfers of public securities.
22. State and local income taxes have been disregarded throughout this Article, but
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would be around $28,000, assuming a maximum rate for those years of
35%. Since dividends and capital gains can be taxed at as low as 5%
from 2003 to 2008,23 even with the “temporary” 15% rate, a parent can
save another 10% ($8000) per year by shifting some stocks to her
children.24 Assume Mother is fifty years old, widowed, and has four
children, ranging in ages from fifteen to twenty-one. Her other stocks
and assets are estimated to be worth $5,000,000.
Mother decides to give each of her four children $250,000 worth of G,
Inc. stock, all in one year or over four to five years.25 In this scenario,
Mother will have no taxable gain on the gift of appreciated property to
her children. Her gift tax exclusion of $1,000,00026 eliminates any
wealth transfer tax on this stock transfer. She can effectively shift the
income taxation of the $80,000 in annual dividend income to her
children, provided she follows well-defined steps.
The simplest method is to transfer the stock to a custodianship account
for each child under twenty-one, pursuant to the Uniform Transfer to
Minors Act, which has been adopted in one form or another in all
states.27 The custodian, who should be a third person or financial
institution, is empowered to accumulate the income until the child
reaches twenty-one,28 at which time it must be distributed to the child.
So long as the income is not used to legally support the child, the
accumulated income is taxed directly to the child.29 Assuming the
in states such as California and New York, residents would pay another 9%–10% tax on
these dividends. Assuming Mother in our example lived in one of these states, her total
net rate of taxes (state and federal), after deducting the state tax on her federal income
tax return, could run as high as 25%–30%. California’s highest income tax rate is 9.3%.
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17041(a) (West 2004); New York’s highest state income tax
rate is 7.7%, with another 2% for the New York City residents. N.Y. TAX LAW § 601
(Consol. 2004); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 3 (Consol. 2004).
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. The new 5% rate for dividends and capital gains applies to those in the regular
10%–15% lower income tax bracket. Thus, a child with under $28,400 (the 2003 rate
bracket) of taxable income is taxed at 5% on dividends and capital gains. I.R.C. §§
1(h)(3), (11) (2004).
25. In discussing the probable income and gift tax consequences, I will concentrate
on the main thesis of this Article, from a policy perspective, and include only an
overview of the technical planning rules.
26. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 71–72 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2505 (2004)).
27. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have promulgated such acts. The
Acts vary somewhat from state to state. See, e.g., California Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act, CAL. PROB. CODE § 3900 et seq. (West 2004).
28. This is most often the case even though the age of majority in a particular state
may be under twenty-one.
29. The use of a trust instead of a custodian account while the children are minors
is now less satisfactory for income tax purposes. Since 1993, Congress compressed the
rate brackets for the income accumulated by a trust so that the highest rate bracket (35%)
is reached at around $9550. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. However, trust
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children have no other taxable income, the total income tax liability for
the four children on their total share of the dividend income would be no
more than $4000 per year (5% x $80,000), or $8000 less each year than
would have been paid by their Mother had she not made the gifts. By
delaying the transfer of the stock to the custodian until the minor reaches
fourteen years of age, the children avoid the so-called “Kiddie Tax”
which taxes “unearned” income, such as the dividends in this case, at the
parent’s higher rate bracket.30 In years prior to 2003 and after 2008
(assuming Congress does not retain this rate reduction), Mother would
save $16,000 per year. If each of the children should sell the stock (even
during the 2003–2008 period) for $250,000, their $225,000 capital gain
(donor’s basis of $25,000 for each donee)31 would be taxed at no more
than 15%.
Even though this is the same rate as Mother would pay if she sold the
stock while she owned it, the time value of money works to the family’s
advantage where the deferral of a “realized” taxable gain, coupled with
the tax savings on shifting the dividend income to the children, could
potentially result in a significant tax savings to the family. In addition,
by parting with control of the shares of stock given to her children
(something that is more difficult in closely held businesses and
impossible for services taxpayers who would like to shift a portion of
their services income to children), Mother has eliminated these stocks
from her estate for wealth transfer purposes.
The bigger point, however, is that the 2003 rate reduction on
dividends and capital gains will generally favor those with publicly
traded stocks, giving that class of taxpayers more net cash to pay their
children’s higher education costs.
Because publicly traded stocks are passive investments not requiring
any management activity by the owner, the custodian device, intended
originally only for these stocks, serves the goals of parents who wish to
lower their income tax liability. The corporation simply sends the
dividend checks to the custodian who then deposits them in an account
income which is distributed to a beneficiary is taxed at the normal rate schedule. I.R.C.
§ 1(e); cf. id. § 677(b), which taxes a grantor on income of a trust used to satisfy a
grantor’s obligation of support.
30. Id.. § 1(g). The child’s income tax liability may be further reduced by the
standard deduction. Id. § 63(c). Where the child is under age fourteen, the Kiddie Tax
can be avoided by transferring low-yield stock, which is expected to increase in value
after age fourteen.
31. Id. § 1015(a).
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for the child. The more elaborate trust structure is unnecessary for this
type of property unless the parent wishes to curtail the use of the income
by the child after age twenty-one. In most cases, the children expend the
accumulated income for their education or support after they reach
majority.
Mother’s transfer of the stock to her children also results in wealth
transfer tax savings. There are two components of the wealth transfer
tax—a gift tax to the donor on lifetime gifts and an estate tax on gifts
taking effect at the decedent’s death. There is a one-time unified credit
equivalent to $1,000,000 of wealth, increasing to $3,500,000 by 2009,
after which it sunsets in 2010, and reappears in 2011 restoring pre-2001
levels of tax.32 In addition, a donor may exclude $10,000 per year per
donee ($20,000 if her spouse consents),33 provided the gift constitutes a
“present interest” in the property to the donee. Gifts to minors qualify as
present interests even though held in an accumulation account by a
custodian.34
With respect to the gift tax annual exclusion, a recent case illustrates
how a gift of interests by parents to their children in a family tree farm
business, in the form of a Limited Liability Company, did not qualify for
the annual gift tax exclusion.35 The court determined that the donor
parents retained control over the interests transferred. Unlike ownership
shares in a public or large corporation, which can be easily separated
from the donor’s retained shares, a gift of ownership interests in smaller
businesses cannot be separated, practically, from the retained shares.
This may be an appropriate result for other tax policy reasons, but it is
difficult to justify this distinction, other than its formalistic nature, as a
means of banning assignments of income for income or wealth transfer
tax purposes.
Taxpayers who have exhausted their $1,000,000 lifetime credit are
32. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38. The gift tax, however, with a $1,000,000 lifetime exclusion,
remains in a new role as a “backstop,” not to the estate tax, but to the income tax. The
apparent theory is that taxpayers could give assets to lower bracket family members for a
few years, pay no gift tax, but shift income to lower bracket members, who could then
re-gift the assets back to the original donor also without a gift tax.
33. I.R.C. § 2503(b). The exclusion is increased by a cost-of-living adjustment,
currently $1000. Thus, with spousal consent, the amounts are increased from $11,000 to
$22,000. Id. § 2503(b)(2).
34. Income from property transferred to a trust for the benefit of a minor can also
qualify as a present interest for the gift tax annual exclusion even though the trust
accumulates the income until the child reaches age twenty-one. However, as mentioned
above, the accumulated income is taxed at the higher marginal rates for income tax
purposes. One would then weigh the gift/estate tax savings against the higher income
tax rates (but no higher than the donor’s rates).
35. Hackl v. Commissioner, 335 F.3d 664, 665–68 (7th Cir. 2003).
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also able to avoid gift tax liability entirely by paying tuition to an
educational organization on behalf of any individual.36
A gift of publicly traded stock also avoids the complex valuation rules
where, as in gifts of closely held business interests and real estate, for
example, the donor retains a life or other interest in a portion of the
property transferred. Congress regarded these split-interest gifts (a
practical necessity in private businesses) as devices to avoid gift and
estate tax by subtracting the retained interest from the value of the
transferred interest.37 Legislation enacted in 1990 in effect increases the
value of the transferred interest and thus the gift tax paid by the donor.38
This section is generally not applied to publicly traded stocks.
B. Private Business Ownership Interests
Unlike stocks or securities of publicly traded companies, ownership or
income interests in closely held corporations or in partnerships cannot be
transferred to children for tax purposes, particularly minor children,
without substantial difficulty. The basic problem is the overriding
perception of parental control. When a parent has a controlling interest
in a private business, a gift of some part of her ownership interest to
children is a transfer of property and not a mere assignment of income.
The only characteristic which distinguishes this type of capital
investment from publicly-traded stocks is the active involvement

36. I.R.C. § 2503(e)(2)(A). This exclusion is not restricted by the normal
$10,000/$20,000 annual exclusion in § 2503(b) and thus does not come within the
present interest requirement. Thus, a taxpayer with minor children or grandchildren can
pay all their college tuition, without gift tax liability. In this instance, we are talking
about wealthier taxpayers who are affected by the gift tax, some of whom derive their
income from nonpublicly held securities or even from services. However, the largest
segment of wealth transfer taxpayers are more likely than not in the public securities
category, for reasons discussed above. Services taxpayers, however, can pay the tuition
only with after-income tax dollars.
37. See infra note 38.
38. I.R.C. § 2701. For an explanation of the operation of this provision, see BORIS
I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 90–96 (8th ed. 2000). Section
2701 imposes special gift tax valuation rules, where, for example, the controlling
shareholder of a closely held corporation attempts to shift the future appreciation in
value of her stock to her children by an “estate freeze” technique. I.R.C. § 2701. The
parent gifts the common stock to her children, and retains preferred stock with voting
control, an annual dividend, and a liquidation preference. Section 2701 acts to depress
the value of the retained preferred stock, thus in effect increasing the value of the
common stock for gift tax purposes. Id.
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(normally) of the parent in the operations of the business.39 For
example, if the parent (or grandparent) has a hardware business worth
$5,000,000 and would like to irrevocably transfer 20% or $1,000,000 of
that business to his four children, some of whom are under the age of
majority, but over fourteen years of age, the income and wealth transfer
tax consequences depend on the parent’s success in avoiding some
difficult obstacles.
Assume the business is conducted in corporate form, with the parent
owning all the capital stock, and that its annual taxable income is
$200,000. For income tax purposes, the corporation is a separate legal
entity, paying a corporate level tax on its taxable income. If the children
are still under the age of majority, title to the stock should be in the name
of an entity or person independent of the parent. Otherwise, the IRS
could take the position that the parent is the de facto owner of the stock
and any distribution of dividends remains taxable to the parent.40
Transferring the stock to a custodian account under one of the Uniform
Transfer to Minors Acts may be theoretically possible in some states so
long as the parent is not the custodian. While there is a legal separation
of ownership of the stock, there are practical restraints, such as the right
of the custodian to vote the stock and to potentially interfere with
management of the corporation. In addition, when the children reach
majority, the custodianship must terminate. If they are away at college,
for example, or if the stock is transferred to a trust, the trustee (also best
required to be independent of the parent) would normally distribute trust
income to the children to avoid being taxed at the highest rate on any
accumulated trust income over $9,550.41 Moreover, the trust arrangement
may be cumbersome and interfere with the customary operation of the
business.
The gift tax consequences to the parent may be governed by the
39. The estate tax provides some valuation relief for certain farms and closely held
businesses. I.R.C. § 2032A. But apart from the problems in complying with these
incentives, the provisions have limited fiscal application because of the small number of
estates that are required to pay a death tax.
40. If any portion of the corporate profit is in reality attributable to services of the
parent, the distribution of that portion to the children could be argued to be a violation of
the Earl case. If the corporation is an “S” corporation (where income and loss is passed
through and taxed at the shareholder level), section 1366(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code requires that the corporate profit must be first reduced by the “reasonable
compensation” of the controlling shareholder (the parent, usually), and thus taxed to the
parent-assignor, before the remaining profit is allocated to the other shareholders. I.R.C.
§ 1366(e). Similar rules apply to family partnerships. Id. § 704(e). It could also be
determined that the dividends are in reality payment of the parent’s obligation of support
and thus be taxed to the parent. Id. § 677(b).
41. Id. § 1(e). This is the dollar amount for 2004, adjusted for inflation each year,
based on changes in the Consumer Price Index. See Revenue Proc. 2003–85, § 3, 2003–
49 I.R.B. 1184.
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special valuation rules applicable to retained interests,42 possibly
increasing the value of stock transferred to the children. In a closely
held corporation there is also the problem of assigning a value to the
business which is not traded in a public market.
The uncertainties associated with transfers of corporate stock in
private companies leads us into a brief discussion of the use of trusts,
and three pass-through entities—the “S” corporation, partnerships, and
limited liability companies—as potential avenues for income splitting
with children. Some of these are aimed primarily at reducing the wealth
transfer tax burden—in other words, to keep the transferred interests out
of the transferors’ or parents’ estates. While discussion of each of these
methods is beyond the scope of this Article, a very general overview
may be helpful in assessing their effectiveness and efficiency.
Historically, the use of trusts was the most efficient way to accomplish
income splitting with children. However, Congress’s concern (perhaps
obsession) with avoidance of the graduated income tax rate structure led
it, in 1993, to compress the tax rates on income accumulated in trusts.43
Income splitting with children in lower tax brackets could then be better
accomplished by regular partnerships,44 S corporations,45 and family
limited partnerships,46 where the business income (or loss) is passed
through to each partner or shareholder whether or not distributed to these
owners. At the same time, the emergence of another state-created
entity—the “limited liability company,” taxed as a partnership in most
cases47—offers another option for avoiding double tax on corporate
profits, while retaining limited liability protection.
As for the use of a partnership to operate a business, the parent could
start a new business48 and transfer some assets to her children who could
then become co-transferors of those assets to a new partnership.49
42. See I.R.C. § 2701 and supra note 38.
43. Omnibus Budget Reconcilliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§
13201(a), 13202(a), 107 Stat. 312, (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1(e)).
44. I.R.C. §§ 701–709.
45. Id. §§ 1361–1363.
46. For discussion of family limited partnerships see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
47. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (2002).
48. If the parent operated her existing business in corporate form, there would be a
potential two-level tax on liquidation distributions. I.R.C. §§ 331, 336. The corporation
could elect S corporation status without a tax, but the conditions for S corporation status
are cumbersome.
49. Sections 721 and 722 allow transfers of appreciated property (not services) to
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However, the issue of parental control may prevent the successful
implementation of this plan. If the partnership income is generated by
services of the parent-donor, or by a combination of services and capital,
the profits cannot be divided among partners without first allocating a
reasonable compensation for the parent, effectively prohibiting an
allocation or shifting of at least a portion of the income to the childrendonees of the partnership interest.50 The same is true for S Corporations.51
C. Services Businesses
In this part, I will discuss the prohibition on parental shifting of income to
their children where the income is derived from services. As noted in
Part II, the Earl doctrine—banning assignment of income52 from
services—does not preclude the shifting of other types of income, such
as dividends, interest, rent, unrealized gains, and other income from
capital investment, by transferring a “vertical slice” of a portion of the
property itself.
The most contentious problem in prohibiting income splitting of
services is where the taxpayer’s income is derived from a combination
of both personal services and capital. The IRS and Treasury Department
have tried to deal with this problem in other tax law contexts, but
generally without success.53 The attempted solution is to treat no more
than 30% of the net profit as compensation for services, the remainder
deemed as income derived from capital.54 For example, if a doctor were
a partner in a diagnostic clinic which has invested substantial capital in
MRI and other radiological equipment, the doctor could assign some
part of her income from the clinic to her children, provided she could
ascertain what portion of her income was from services and what portion
from capital—no easy task for her or the IRS. Likewise, a taxpayer
whose business involved the development of computer software would
have the same problem.55 The issue is becoming more pervasive as we
move to an economy where historically based distinctions are blended
be transferred into a partnership without income taxation. The partnership retains the
same tax basis for these assets as the transferors’ bases. Id. §§ 721–722.
50. Id. § 704(e)(2).
51. Id. § 1366(e).
52. Supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
53. See Snyder, supra note 9.
54. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.911-2(c)(2) (2002), dealing with the foreign earned
income exclusion. The 30% rule was found earlier in the now repealed 50% maximum
tax on “earned income” (services), where other income was taxed at 70%. I.R.C. § 1348;
Michael Asimow, Section 1348: The Death of Mickey Mouse?, 58 CAL. L. REV. 801,
835–60 (1970) (discussing the dual rate structure).
55. For an illustration of how courts struggle with this issue, see Siegel v. United
States, 464 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1972).
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out of the system. The tax law will be forced to adapt to these changes if
only to be consistent in its treatment of taxpayers who are substantively
the same.
As our economy takes on more of a high technology profile,
inventions, computer software, and other intellectual property, as well as
the more conventional types of business activity, such as auto body
shops, film production, plumbing contracting, and embalming, represent
income produced with both labor and capital mixed together.56
One could argue that the rationale for treating services more harshly is
that they have not yet been taxed, and that the earner of those services
should be the one who is taxed. Or one might argue that the tax law
encourages capital investment, recognizing the risk taking aspect.
However, both of these arguments have nothing to do with the income
splitting issue, where, for example, the dividends and the unrealized
appreciation on stocks will not be taxed to the parent who owned the
stock while it was appreciating in value. In fact, the services, even if
allowed to be assigned, would be taxed in the current tax period,
whereas the transfer of unrealized gain might not be taxed for several
years, if ever. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the risk taking issue
has a direct tax policy connection to the income splitting issue.
The courts and the IRS have had considerable difficulty in coming up
with a consistent standard in cases involving assignment of services
income.57 Patent and copyright cases are illustrative. Where the
taxpayer obtains a patent and assigns the patent to a family member,
even though the taxpayer invented the item with her own efforts, it is
assumed by the courts that the royalties are taxed to the family member
since the taxpayer retained no interest in the patent itself.58 But where
the taxpayer-inventor assigns the rights to a copyright or a patent created
with her own efforts and retains some contractual rights (such as the
right to bargain with the manufacturer for the fixing of future royalties),
there is some possibility that the assignment would be deemed
incomplete, leaving the royalties to be taxed to the assignor-parent.59 It
56. This issue is discussed with illustrations in Snyder, supra note 9.
57. See Snyder, supra note 9.
58. Rev. Rul. 54-599, 1954-2 C.B. 52. But cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1948) (holding that the taxpayer-assignor retained too much control over the
assigned patent and therefore remained taxable on the royalties).
59. Cf. Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that the royalty
payments assigned both property and income rights and thus were valid assignments
taxable to the donees); Strauss v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding
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is difficult to predict the outcome of many cases where one small change
in the facts will change the result from a transfer of services income to a
transfer of property.
The results are just as murky in cases involving professional services.
In one case,60 a taxpayer, a lawyer, rendered services for Firm A, then
left Firm A and became a partner in Firm B. He received fees for
services he rendered while at Firm A after he joined Firm B and paid
these fees over to Firm B. Even though the taxpayer rendered these
services, the court held that he was not taxable on the fees collected by
Firm B. The same result should occur if the lawyer were to assign his
services income to his family, yet, in another case, a dentist assigned his
“lifetime services” to a family trust he created. The trust agreed to
manage the dentist’s practice for a percentage of his income. The court
held the assignment invalid and taxed the dentist on the entire income of
the practice.61
As indicated earlier,62 the prohibition against assignment of income
from services can also be found in the Internal Revenue Code. Congress
has incorporated the Earl doctrine into the family business context in
two pass-through entities, partnerships and S corporations. Section
704(e)(2) requires the donor (such as a parent) of a gift of a partnership
interest to be taxed on the value of her services before the remaining
partnership profit is allocated and taxed to the partners (including the
children of the donor). The effect of this provision is to allow income
splitting for nonservices income, but not for that portion of the income
which is deemed to be services rendered by the donor. The same
concept is applicable to an S corporation.63
IV. SOME OTHER ATTEMPTS AT INCOME SPLITTING
A. Gift and Leaseback: “Tax Avoidance or a Legitimate
Business Transaction”?
Consider the case of a medical doctor who owns no publicly traded
stocks to transfer to his children, but instead transfers his medical office
building or his medical equipment or both to an irrevocable trust for the
benefit of his children, naming his attorney or accountant as trustee. The
doctor will then lease back the building or equipment from the trust for a
that assignment of royalties from personal a services contract should be taxed to the
donor who rendered the services).
60. Schneer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 643 (1991).
61. Pfluger v. Commissioner, 840 F.2d 1379 (7th Cir. 1988). Of course, it did not
help the taxpayer that he actually was a “tax protester.” Id. at 1386.
62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
63. I.R.C. § 1366(e) (2004).
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fair rental price, deducting the rent paid to the trust as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. If successful, the doctor has in effect
shifted an amount of income equal to the rent paid, which is deducted
against his other income.64
The federal courts are divided on the legitimacy of this type of
transaction. The main issue is whether the rent paid is deductible as a
business expense under Internal Revenue Code section 162(a)(3), which
restricts the deduction where the lessee-doctor has an ownership or
equity interest in the leased property. The IRS generally balks at these
family leasebacks as disguised income-shifting schemes, requiring the
taxpayers to litigate in the courts. In one case, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals allowed the deduction even though there was no strong
business purpose for the transaction, noting that the there was a change
in economic interests of the parties resulting in no legally retained equity
interest by the lessee doctor.65 However, other Circuits have upheld the
government’s position.66
Because the IRS is likely to scrutinize most of these transactions,
taxpayers must be prepared to structure the gift-leaseback, paying
careful attention to the economic details. Here again, we see the concept
of parental control utilized to challenge semipassive investments.67
64. The economics of the transaction may be structured to avoid any gift tax by
transferring property with a mortgage liability, which reduces the equity in the property
to an amount below the gift tax credits and annual exclusions available to the doctor and
his wife. Id. §§ 2503, 2513. This avoids the complex valuation of retained interest rules
in Section 2701. The trust itself can offset the rent income received on the lease to the
settlor-doctor by deducting depreciation on the property, id. §§ 167–168, and the interest
on the mortgage. Id. § 163. Because the trust has no significant net income, neither the
trust nor the beneficiaries will be subject to tax on the accumulated income at the higher
compressed marginal rates of I.R.C. Section 1(e). See supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
65. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983).
66. See cases cited in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 562–63 (3rd ed. 1995). One commentator
has suggested ways to correct the interpretations by these courts. See Robert Peroni,
Untangling the Web of Gift-Leaseback Jurisprudence, 68 MINN. L. REV. 735 (1984).
67. Other attempts at income splitting with children include the “private annuity.”
A taxpayer transfers some income-producing property to children who then promise to
support her for life. It is similar to a bargain sale and has income and wealth tax consequences,
and involves complex valuation issues as well as detailed annuity present value calculations.
The IRS often has attempted to recharacterize such arrangements as the
reservation by the taxpayer of a life interest in a grantor trust, as defined by §
677(a). All income from such trusts remains taxable to the grantor under § 671
on the theory that he has not given up sufficient incidents of ownership over
the property placed in trust.
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The larger issue, which is the focus of my thesis in this Article, is why
not reverse fields and look upon all income splitting with children as a
positive rather than a negative goal of the tax system? This is a far more
constructive way to deal with a wider group of children’s access to
higher education, instead of litigating formalistic distinctions between
good and bad gift-leasebacks.
B. Family Limited Partnerships
A limited liability company or a family limited partnership can be
effective for income-shifting purposes, but if the parent retains voting
and other managerial control, the income may not be taxable to the
children, but instead to the parent. In addition, the recent proliferation of
family limited partnerships to reduce gift and estate tax liability has not
been readily accepted by the IRS, requiring costly litigation in the courts
to establish a complex sequence of valuation discounts for wealth
transfer tax purposes. For example, two recent U.S. Tax Court opinions
accepted the family limited partnership even though there was no
business purpose for their formation.68 However, Strangi was partly
reversed on appeal to allow the IRS to pursue its claim in the Tax Court
that decedent retained a life estate under section 2036 of the Internal
Revenue Code, similar to the parental retention of control theory
discussed in this Article.69 There remains much uncertainty as to the
future resolution of these issues.
The IRS is particularly likely to contest the taxpayer’s characterization of a
private annuity arrangement where the value of the property given up
substantially exceeds the present value of the annuity received.
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 66, at 549. Two cases illustrating these issues are
LaFargue v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 800 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.
1986), and Estate of Bergen v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 543 (1943). Loans to children at
no or low (below market rate) interest rates are dealt with in section 7872 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which imputes interest income to the parent-lender. See also Dickman v.
Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (holding an interest-free loan without consideration
to be a gift under the gift tax).
68. Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506 (2000). The
courts recognized the limited partnership for gift and estate tax purposes after parents
transferred assets to a family partnership, becoming limited partners. The court
discounted the value of the limited partnership interests as minority interests and as
lacking marketability thus reducing gift and estate tax liability.
69. Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). Litigation
continues in the Strangi context. See, e.g., Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner (Strangi
II), 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331 (2003) (on remand from the Fifth Circuit); Estate of Stone v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551, 578–81 (2003) (dealing with the bona fide sale
exception to section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code; see J. Joseph Korpics,
Mining Stone For Material Direction Regarding the Bona Fide Sale Exception (And
More) as Applied to FLPs, 102 TAX NOTES 1123 (Mar. 1, 2004).
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The attitude of the courts toward family partnerships in general is that
they are tax-avoidance devices. For example, in Strangi the Tax Court
stated: “Family partnerships must be closely scrutinized by the courts
because the family relationship ‘so readily lends itself to paper
arrangements having little or no relationship to reality.’”70 Yet the
court went on to hold that despite the partnership’s lack of business
purpose, the partnership legally changed the relationships between
decedent and his heirs.71
V. A FEW PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The present state of the tax law on income splitting with minor and
adult children sanctions an inconsistent treatment of gifts of income to
children of passive investors (mainly in publicly traded stocks) as
compared to children of active earners and private business owners. I
question those who conclude that income splitting is not as prevalent
today. They attribute this to a compression of income tax rates on
trusts—so that accumulated income of trusts in excess of $9550 (for
2004) is taxed at the highest marginal rate of 35%72—and to the fact that
children of wealthy parents are often in higher income tax brackets to
begin with. There is no available hard data on this.73 In any event, there
is no justification for allowing greater opportunity for income splitting
for one class of taxpayers over others. There is also no data on the
extent of any revenue loss to the Treasury.
Other commentators take a broader look at the issue by examining
parent/children taxpayer profiles and econometric data to determine the
impact of these income splitting and other laws on future generations of
children.74
The combination of lack of uniformity and incomplete data makes it
imperative that we explore alternative ways to deal with these income
splitting issues. One plausible solution would be to flatten the income
70. Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 484 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 492–93.
72. I.R.C. § 1(e).
73. See the illustrative case on Mother’s gift of public stock, supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Description,
Profile of Taxpayers, and Economic Consequences, OTA Paper 80 (Dec. 1998); Allan J.
Samansky, Tax Policy and the Obligation to Support Children, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 329
(1996); Anne L. Alstott Comments on Samansky, “Tax Policy and the Obligation to
Support Children”, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 381 (1996).
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tax rate structure and permanently repeal the wealth transfer taxes. In
addition to the fact that the wealth taxes produce only around 1% of our
total federal tax revenue, the strongest case for repeal, here again, is that
some wealthy taxpayers escape the tax while others cannot, either
because of the nature of their income-producing activity or because of
astute estate planning advice, or both.75 However, it is probably
unrealistic to explore this flat rate alternative at this time in the context
of the present income tax structure.
The consumption tax proposals introduced in Congress in the mid1990’s, such as the “Flat Tax,”76 would have (1) adopted a single, flat
rate structure, (2) taxed all businesses alike (whether income was
produced from capital investment or services), and (3) eliminated any
need for a ban on “assignment of income.” While the recent rate
reductions on dividend and capital gain income77 may be viewed as a
step in the direction of a consumption type tax, where savings are treated
more favorably, there is no indication that Congress is ready for such a
major change in the current tax system.78
Another alternative is to do away with artificial tax law distinctions
involving “parental control” and abolishing the increasingly difficult
distinction between income from services and income from capital. This
also might be a politically unrealistic proposal without first ascertaining
the stakes involved and getting a handle on what types and amounts of
income splitting with children are actually occurring.
To eliminate discrimination I suggest, as a starting point, consideration
of a two-pronged short-term (perhaps five years) proposal:
1. Taxpayers with minor children or perhaps grandchildren could
elect to shift up to 5% of their current adjusted gross income (whether
active or passive, whether from public or private business, including
wages or other services income) to their minor children or grandchildren
75. An often advertised scheme shows how multimillionaires with liquid and
passive investments make use of the life insurance exclusion from both income and
estate taxes to enhance the size of their estate, compared to those taxpayers who are
actively involved in their private businesses, which usually have less ready cash for the
one-time insurance premium necessary to engage in the life insurance scheme.
76. Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong.
(1995).
77. See supra note 4.
78. For a few examples of the advantages and disadvantages of a consumptiontype tax, see William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer
than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980); Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos,
Redefining The Role of the Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law “Private” Through
the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 1 (1996); Lester B.
Snyder & Roger J. Higgins, Evaluating the Consumption Tax Proposals: Changes in the
Taxation of Interspousal Transactions, Use of Trusts, and Revising the Meaning of “Tax
Planning”, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1485 (1996).
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through a specially defined (by federal tax law) uniform custodial
account.
A tax credit would presumably be more equitable than a tax
deduction, so that all taxpayers, no matter what marginal rate bracket
they are in, would be included. The credit could be refundable, so that
individuals with minimal or no tax liability could receive some benefit
as well. There are a variety of ways to craft the credit. For example,
one model could allow a credit equal to a percentage of taxable income,
starting with, say, 5% for taxpayers with under $100,000 of taxable
income and scaled down from 5% to 1% for those with taxable income
over $100,000. The credit could be limited to one child (under
seventeen years of age) per year so that taxpayers would be able to rotate
the credit to help set aside funds to finance their childrens’ college
education as each child reaches college age.79 More flexibility could be
achieved by allowing an election between parent and grandparent as to
which one takes the credit in a particular year.
79. An alternative method could be similar to the current child credit, which
provides for an annual credit of $700 (increasing to $1000 in 2010) per child, without the
$110,000 of adjusted gross income threshold limitation ($75,000 for single parents).
I.R.C. § 24 (2004). However, my proposal anticipates a higher tax benefit tied to
financing higher education for one child (possibly two) each year. The child credit and
complicated education credits (I.R.C. §§ 25A, 25B), which are nonrefundable credits,
can be replaced with the broader based credit I am proposing. See id. §§ 25A, 25B.
Although the thrust of this Article is policy oriented and thus not based on revenue
costs or estimates, one gets a sense of the extent of the child and education credits by
looking at the data in the IRS’s Statistics of Income Bulletin for individual tax returns for
the year 2002. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Bulletin (Washington,
D.C. Winter 2003–2004). Approximately 26 million taxpayers (about 20% of all
taxpayers) took advantage of the child credit, for a total amount of $21.5 billion, and
only 6.5 million returns (about 5% of all taxpayers) took the education credits amounting
to $4.9 billion. Id. at 15. The total revenue cost of these two credits, about $26.5 billion,
could be replaced with the proposal suggested in this Article by increasing the higher
education credit to say, $40 billion to $50 billion, thus eliminating the present bias
against the majority of children. Assuming a credit of 5% of taxable income, the total
revenue cost would depend on the number of children (using under seventeen years of
age as the age cap) for all taxpayers. If we use the child credit numbers for 2002, only
20% of all taxpayers availed themselves of that credit. But assuming that the 20% figure
is lower than the actual number of taxpayers with children, were we to increase the
number to 25%, somewhere around $1 trillion (25% of the $4 trillion shown in the 2002
Statistics of Income) would be the base figure of taxable income of taxpayers with
children. Id. A 5% credit on taxable income results in about $50 billion in revenue cost
to the government. The distribution effect among income classes (by size of taxable
income) would depend on a number of factors, but by scaling the credit downward for
the upper income taxpayers, the higher education tax incentives for all taxpayers would
be far more equitable than under current tax law.
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In addition, a significant portion of the nontax direct grant
expenditures could be replaced by the refundable tax credit, proposed
herein. Any additional revenue cost to make up any difference, if there
is one, would be a relatively small cost in return for the substantial
benefits that would be utilized by a broader group of children for their
college education than is the case under current laws.80
This is a complete about-face from current law. Instead of looking at
income splitting as an evil concept, this proposal would regard it as a
positive approach which should be strongly encouraged.
2. In order to collect data on the extent and nature of income splitting
in this country, we would require all those who elect to take the new
education credit as described in (1) above, to file an information return,
similar to a Form 1099, but expanded to include the details of the
uniform custodial account contributions. In addition to the collection of
data for evaluation purposes, the information returns would be available
to the child or his/her custodian and would serve to protect the child’s
interest, and thus serve as a response to current law concepts of parental
control.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our graduated income tax structure provides an incentive to split
income with lower-bracket family members. However, transferring
income to children has been treated inconsistently and unfairly in the
federal income and wealth transfer tax laws. Some parents have much
more latitude to shift income to their children than do others. Parents
who own publicly traded securities are the most favored species; those
who derive their income from services and private business are least
favored. The rationale given for treating gifts of private business
interests to children less favorably is that the parent has not parted with
control of the property. The parental control test eludes gifts of some
shares of a parent’s publicly traded securities.
Tax lawyers and tax academics, unfortunately, appear to condemn
80. The proposal suggested in this Article is more equitable than the recent
Treasury Department proposal for tax exempt “Lifetime Savings Accounts” (allowing
contributions of $7500 a year, with capital gains, dividends, and certain interest earned in
the accounts treated as tax-free). Arguably, this is more expensive, more damaging to
existing pension/retirement plans, and may jeopardize savings bank accounts. It would
also have little benefit for low-income Americans. See Letter from Frank Keating of the
American Council of Life Insurers, to Secretary of the Treasury (Jan. 20, 2004)
(published in Insurance Group Wary of Lifetime Savings Account Plan, 2004 TAX NOTES
TODAY 23–53, Feb. 4, 2004); see also Thomas B. Edsall & Jonathan Weisman, Wall
Street Firms Funnel Millions to Bush: Finance Sector Produces Surge of Cash to
President Who Cut Taxes on Dividends, Gains, WASH. POST, May 24, 2004, at A04.
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income splitting in its most obvious form, but condone it in less obvious
methodologies, such as gift-leasebacks, use of family limited
partnerships, private annuities, and other tax-avoidance arrangements.
One proposed solution to this lack of uniformity is a two-pronged
structure: (1) a new 5% refundable tax credit election by parents with
minor children, for amounts placed in a federally defined uniform
custodial account, to be set aside for higher education costs for those
children; and (2) a manageable information reporting and accounting
system.
This would provide us with reliable data on the extent of income
earmarked for higher education. It would also do away with the
outdated assignment-of-income doctrine in the area of education. The
reporting would also make some information available to the children’s
custodians to assure the children that they are entitled to retain the
income or property they were taxed on. At the same time, it would
neutralize the parental control factor that has driven so much of the case
law in this area.
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